Ronald H. Nash, “Worldviews in Conflict: Choosing Christianity in a World of Ideas”, Zondervan Publishing, 1992.

“The point to situation ethics is, … Nothing is intrinsically good except love; nothing intrinsically bad except nonlove. … Depending on the situation, love may find it necessary to lie, to steal, even presumably to fornicate, to blaspheme, and to worship false gods. The only absolute is love. … A proper response to situation ethics will begin by pointing out that love is insufficient in itself to provide moral guidance for each and every moral action.” (p. 45)

“If choice is a condition for doing good, is it not also a condition for doing acts of moral evil?” (p. 108)

“Clearly we live in a universe that exhibits order, an order expressed in the laws of nature described by the appropriate science. Moral freedom could not exist apart from such an orderly environment. If the world were totally unpredictable, if we could never know from one moment to the next, what to expect from nature, both science and meaningful moral conduct would be impossible.” (p. 109)

“Human beings cannot grow in an environment that is free of risk and danger and disappointment. God, it appears, had good reasons for placing us in an environment that challenges and tests us.” (pp. 110-111)

“Any sensitive and observant person must admit that many evils that appear to be gratuitous pervade the world:… But given the limitations of human knowledge, it is hard to see how any human being could actually know that a specific instance of evil really is gratuitous.” (p. 112)

“The interesting point here is that few naturalists seem to have realized how their relativist approach to good and evil disqualifies them logically fro being advocates of the problem of evil. Whenever they seek to embarrass Christians by describing a given evil, they do so in terms that simply are not consistent with their naturalistic understanding of things.” (p. 114)

“Thus no thoroughgoing Naturalist believes in free will: for free will would mean that human beings have the power of independent action, the power of doing something more or other than what was involved by the total series of events. And any such separate power of originating events is what the Naturalist denies.” (p. 117)

“One of naturalism’s major problems is explaining how mindless forces give rise to minds, knowledge, sound reasoning, and moral principles that really do report how human beings ought to behave.” (p. 125)